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The Impact of Parental Income and Education on the Schooling of Children 
1. Introduction 
A considerable literature has focused on the effects of parental background on outcomes for their 
children such as cognitive skills, education, health and subsequent income (for a review see Black 
and Devereux (2011)). There is little doubt that economic status is positively correlated across 
generations. Parents might affect the behavior and decisions taken by their children through 
genetic transmission, preferences, or/and environment. Indeed, the view that more educated and 
richer parents can provide a “better” environment for their children has been the basis of many 
interventions.   
The nature of the policy interventions that are suggested depends critically on the nature of the 
intergenerational transmission mechanism and the extent to which the relationship is causal.  In 
particular, it has proven difficult to determine whether the transmission mechanism works through 
inherited genetic factors or environmental factors and, to the extent that it is the latter, what is the 
relative importance of parental education and income?  Moreover, the link between the schooling 
of parents and their children could be due to unobserved inherited characteristics rather than a 
causal effect of parental education or income per se in household production.  This issue is 
explored in detail in the review by Björklund and Salvanes (2011). 
An example of the importance of maternal education on child’s outcome is provided in Currie and 
Moretti (2003) who found a positive relationship between maternal education and their child’s 
birth weight, which is a strong predictor of child health. The existence of such effects provides an 
important argument for subsidizing education, especially in households with low income and/or 
low educated parents. Indeed there may be multiplier effects since policy interventions that 
increase educational attainment for one generation may create spillovers to later generations. The 
literature is not entirely consistent but it is widely believed that, while raising the education of 
mothers and fathers has broadly similar effects on household income, the external effects on 
children associated with parental education are larger for maternal education than for paternal 
because mothers tend to be the main provider of care within the household.  
Understanding the mechanisms by which parental education may affect children’s outcomes is 
more difficult than establishing that there is an effect. Firstly, parental education may be a direct 
input into the production function that generates the quality of the endowments that children have 
in various domains (health, ability etc.). Secondly, it may also affect the choice of other inputs. 
Thirdly, it may indirectly facilitate a higher quantity and/or quality of other inputs through its effect 
on household income. The use of policy instruments such as income transfers to attempt to break 
the cycle of disadvantage presumes this latter route is important. Moreover, once one controls for 
education (as a long-run determinant of the level of permanent income), current income is likely to 
pick up the effect of income shocks that would matter only in the presence of credit market 
constraints.   
This paper addresses an important issue in the existing literature: the causal effect of parental 
education on children, allowing for the separate effects of maternal and paternal education; and 
for the causal effect of household income, controlling for education. To date, no study has 
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simultaneously tried to account for the endogeneity of both parental education and parental 
income. The distinction between education and income is important since differences in policy 
approaches hang on their relative effects. Using a series of British cross-section datasets, we begin 
by confirming the usual finding using least squares - that parental education levels and paternal 
income are positively associated with good child outcomes: in particular, with later school leaving.1 
This outcome measure is important because recent UK governments have targeted a reduction in 
the proportion of pupils leaving at 16 and committed to a phased increase in the minimum age at 
which youths can leave education and training. We go on to use instrumental variable methods to 
take account of the endogeneity of both parental income and education.  We exploit a variety of 
ideas for identification that have been used in other research, including: changes in the minimum 
school leaving age for the parents; month of birth of the parents which captures early school 
tracking that affected the parental cohorts and parental union status and its interactions with 
occupation that affected paternal income.  
 
2. Previous Literature 
It is widely thought that children brought up in less favorable conditions obtain less education 
despite the large financial returns to schooling (Heckman and Masterov (2005). Indeed there is a 
large correlation between the education level of parents and their children (Björklund and Salvanes 
(2011)). However the transmission mechanism behind such intergenerational correlations has 
never been made clear.  Krueger (2004) reviewed various contributions supporting the view that 
financial constraints significantly impact on educational attainment. However, Carneiro and 
Heckman (2004) suggest that current parental income does not explain child educational choices, 
but that family fixed effects that contribute to permanent income, such as parental education 
levels, have a much more positive role.  This is the central conclusion of Cameron and Heckman 
(1998) using US data, and Chevalier and Lanot (2002) using the UK National Child Development 
Study data.   
In the literature to date, researchers have attempted to identify the exogenous effect of either 
parental education or of parental income, but not both effects simultaneously. The literature on 
estimating the causal effect of parental education on the child’s educational attainment has relied 
on three identification strategies: instrumental variables, adopted children, and twins. 
The first identification strategy uses instrumental variables methods based on ‘natural’ 
experiments or policy reforms that change the educational distribution of the parents without 
directly affecting children. Black et al. (2005) exploit Norwegian educational reforms which raised 
                                                          
1  We also investigate the relative effects of parental education levels and household income on educational 
achievement at age 16. High school students in England and Wales usually study up to ten subjects until the age of 16 
which are then examined at the end of compulsory schooling in the school year that they reach 16. These are scored 
as A* to F with A* -C being regarded as passing grades. The government’s objective is that 60% of all 16 year olds pass 
in at least five subjects. This level of achievement is usually required to progress into senior high school. Not 
surprisingly our estimated results for the effect on junior high school achievement closely parallel the results for early 
school leaving and so are not reported here, but are available on request.   
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the minimum number of years of compulsory schooling over a period of time and at differential 
rates between regions of the country. Their IV estimates show little evidence of causal effects 
except for evidence of maternal education on son’s education.  However, Oreopoulos et al. (2006) 
using the same approach, but using US Census data from 1960, 1970 and 1980, report that an 
increase in parental education by one year decreases the probability of a child repeating a 
schooling year (or grade) by between two and seven percentage points. Investigating some 
possible mechanisms for this education transmission, Dixon et al. (2013) confirms the causal effect 
of paternal education on literacy and numeracy skills from as early as age four and estimates that 
by age sixteen, the children of parents affected by a British school leaving age reform gained an 
additional 0.1 of a standard deviation over other children. Lundborg et al. (2011) report a positive 
effect on cognitive, non-cognitive skills and health for Swedish children whose parents were 
affected by a similar reform. Other instruments, such as the 1968 rioting of French students 
(Maurin and McNally 2008), or exogenous changes in the cost of education (Carneiro et al. (2007)), 
or the G.I. Bill (Page 2006) all tend to support a positive causal effect of parental education on the 
human capital of children. Of course, the minimum school leaving age is likely to affect the bottom 
of the schooling distribution more than the top so there is a clear case for thinking, in a 
heterogeneous effects model, that such estimates will provide only LATE estimates that are not 
strictly comparable to OLS. However, to the extent that policymakers are particularly concerned 
about early school leavers, such estimates are still of interest.  
Alternative strategies to account for genetic effects is to compare adopted and natural children 
(Sacerdote (2004) or Plug (2004) or the children of twins (Behrman and Rosenzweig (2002). 
Bjorklund et al. (2006) uses a register of Swedish adoptees, which allows controls for both natural 
and adoptive parents’ education. After correcting for the potential bias caused by non-randomness 
in this population, they find that genetics account for about 50% of the correlation in education 
between generations but also that the causal effect of adoptive parents’ education remains highly 
significant.  
Holmlund et al. (2008) investigate whether the disparities in results are due to differences in the 
sample used or to the identification strategies. Using Swedish Population Register data, they 
implemented all three methods, i.e. twins, adoptees and IV. Their results are consistent with the 
weight of the existing literature. In twin studies, the maternal effect is small and about half of the 
paternal education effect. This conclusion is reversed when using adoptee samples. When relying 
on IV to estimate the causal effect of parental education, the paternal effect is never significant but 
the maternal effect is quite large. They also find that there are non-linearities in the effect of 
education with the effect of parental education being larger at higher levels of education. Pronzato 
(2012) notes that the estimates for maternal education are sensitive to size and selection, in a way 
that can reconcile the results from different studies.  
The literature on the causal effects of parental earnings or incomes on educational outcomes is not 
as extensive as the literature on parental education.  Random assignment experiments are 
potentially informative but uncommon.  Blanden and Gregg (2004) review US and UK evidence on 
the effects of policy changes which largely focus on improving short-term family finances (see also 
Almond and Currie (2010)).  These include initiatives such as the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) 
experiments in the US, which provide financial support to higher housing costs associated with 
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moving to more affluent areas.  MTO programs are associated with noticeable improvements in 
child behavior and test scores, but whether these are caused by the financial gain, changes in the 
physical environment, school effects and/or peer-group changes remains unclear.2  Other US work 
uses welfare-to-work reforms but again the income changes are accompanied by other behavioral 
changes – for example such reforms are aimed at increasing parental labor supply, which may also 
affect child attainment.3  
Sibling-based studies exploit differential outcomes and intertemporal variation in incomes but it is 
far from clear that parents do not take compensatory actions in the face of differential financial 
resources associated with each sibling. If they do, then sibling studies estimate the effects net of 
those actions. Other studies look at value added in the form of changes in outcomes associated 
with changes in income over time to difference out unobserved heterogeneity. Similar studies use 
early measures of outcomes as controls for unobserved heterogeneity. However, estimation of 
such lagged dependent variable models are, in general, inconsistent in the presence of fixed child 
or family effects. Nor are they really very satisfactory ways of dealing with endogeneity because 
income may, itself, respond to lagged outcomes – for example, a failing child may stimulate a 
parent to work harder, to provide more financial resources to allow the child to improve. 
In the absence of convincing experimental evidence and because of doubts over the validity of 
sibling-based studies, instrumental variables have been used to identify the effect of parental 
income effects on child outcomes. Shea (2000) uses union status (and occupation) as an instrument 
for parental income. The identifying assumption is that unionized fathers are not more ‘able’ 
parents than nonunionized fathers with similar observable skills. Mayer (1997) uses variation in 
family income caused by state welfare rules, income sources and income before and after the 
education period of the child, as well as changes in income inequality.  While strong identification 
assumptions are used in both these studies, they both find that changes in parental long-run 
income have only modest and sometimes negligible effects on the human capital of the children.4  
Finally, Jenkins and Schluter (2002) is notable for being one of the few studies to control for both 
income, at various ages and education. They study the type of school attended (vocational or 
academic), using a small German dataset. They find that later income is more important than early 
income, but that income effects are small relative to education effects. However, the analysis 
assumes exogenous income and parental education.  
                                                          
2  Work on MTO by Sanbonmatsu et al. (2006) suggests that MTO-driven neighbourhood effects on academic 
achievement were not significant. 
3  In the UK, the pilots of Educational Maintenance Allowances (EMA’s) provided a sizeable means tested cash benefit 
conditional on participation in education and paid, depending on pilot scheme, either to the parents or directly to the 
child (Dearden et al. 2009).  Enrollments increased by up to 6% in families eligible for full subsidies. However, this 
transfer was conditional on staying in school and so this reform is not directly informative about the effects of 
unconditional variations in income. 
4   Acemoglu and Pischke (2001) use similar arguments to Mayer (1997) and exploit changes in the family income 
distribution between the 1970’s and 1990’s.  They find a 10 percent increase in family income is associated with a 
1.4% increase in the probability of attending a four-year college. Loken (2010) studies the long-term effect of family 
income on children's educational attainment using the Norwegian oil shock in the 1970s as an instrument. They find 
no causal relationship. 
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3. Data, Sample Selection and Sources of Exogenous Variation 
Our analysis is based on the Labour Force Survey (LFS) - a quarterly survey of households in the U.K.  
In each quarter there are roughly 120,000-160,000 respondents (more in earlier surveys) from the 
approximately 50,000-65,000 households surveyed. Households are surveyed for five consecutive 
quarters. We pool the data from households in the fifth quarter over the period 1993-2012.5 
Children aged 16 to 18 living at home are interviewed in the LFS so parental information can be 
matched to the child’s record. Our sub-sample consists of those children observed in LFS at ages 16 
to 18 inclusive (and therefore have made their decision with respect to post compulsory education 
participation) which is approximately 56,000 observations, or 4% of all LFS respondents (which 
corresponds closely to the population census data).  
The age range we consider is limited because we need to observe respondents while they are still 
living at home in order to observe parental background (respondents are not asked directly about 
their parents).  An examination of British Household Panel Survey data suggests that only 6% of 
children aged 16-18 have already left home.  However, this censoring in the LFS data becomes 
more severe with older teenagers - whilst 98% of 16-year-old children are observed living with both 
parents, this proportion in down to 88% for those aged 18 years old.6 We therefore drop 2,581 
teenagers who do not live with their parents and a further 12,995 who live with only one of their 
parents, since we need to observe both paternal and maternal education. 
Due to these age restrictions, the key outcome of interest in this paper is the decision to participate 
in post-compulsory schooling, defined as a dummy equal to one if the 16 to 18 year old child is 
either in post compulsory education at present or was in education between 16 and 18 but had left 
school by the time of interview.7 Only 16 year olds who are surveyed between September and 
December are included to ensure information on their decision to leave or remain in education is 
available.    
To arrive at our final sample we also drop observations from Scotland and Northern Ireland. 
Although these regions changed their minimum school leaving ages at different times than England 
and Wales they also have quite distinct education systems. This drops 5342 observations. 
Moreover, for our instruments to be available we impose the following additional restrictions on 
the data: we select teenagers where the father is working and reporting his income, where both 
parents were born after 1933 (and so were not affected by the earlier raising of the school leaving 
from 14 to 15 and whose school leaving is unlikely to have been directly affected by World War II), 
where both parents were born in the United Kingdom and are currently resident in England or 
Wales. Thus, our estimates need to be viewed as conditional on these selections.8 We also drop 
                                                          
5  Prior to 1993 there was no earnings data in LFS. Between 1993 and 1998, earnings data is available only for fifth wave 
respondents; from 1998 the earnings data is collected in the first and in the final wave.  
6  Re-estimating without the 18 year olds showed no economically or statistically significant differences in results. 
7  We may thus underestimate participation if individuals postpone attending post-compulsory education until they are 
over 18. We believe this is a rather rare event. 
8   Whilst this may create some selection bias it would be difficult to overcome this in our data. Since parental 




any observations where there is missing data on the variables of interest. The details of the original 
LFS data and the impact of the selection criteria on the variables of interest can be seen in Table 1. 
The final sample contains 15,798 observations. In the final two columns of Table 1 we can see that 
the final set of restrictions does not alter the mean age and educational attainment of those 16-18 
year-olds living with both parents.  
Figures 1 and 2 show the participation rate in post-compulsory schooling in our final sample broken 
down by paternal and maternal education.  The education of the children appears closely 
correlated with the education of their parents, particularly up to a school leaving age of 18. Having 
parents with more education than this level does not substantially affect the staying-on probability 
of children, which is then almost 100%.9 The fraction of sons with post compulsory schooling is 30 
points higher for father with a degree (leaving age of 21) compared to those who left school at 15. 
There are some sizable gaps between the participation of girls and boys from lower educated 
parents. Among this group sons are more than 10 percentage points less likely to participate than 
daughters However these gender gaps in educational attainment narrow with parental education. 
Table 2 shows some selected statistics for the sample used in our analysis. The post-compulsory 
schooling participation rate is 73% for boys and 83% for girls.10 There are large differences in the 
parental education and household income levels between those that remain in school compared to 
those that leave: more than one year extra of parental education on average and more than 20% 
higher paternal earnings. Additionally, youth who did not attend post-compulsory education have 
slightly older parents. 
Parental income is potentially endogenous either because it is correlated with unobservable 
characteristics which are correlated with the child’s educational attainment, or because the 
parental education effect is transmitted through income.  Indeed, Shea (2000) estimates the 
impact of parental income using variation in income associated with union membership, industry 
and job loss and finds a negligible impact on human capital for most children (although parental 
income did seem to matter for children whose father had low education). Following Shea (2000) we 
assume that union membership status creates an exogenous change in income, which is 
independent of parenting ability and the child’s educational choice.  Indeed the raw data, 
presented in Table 2, shows that children who stayed on were just as likely to have unionized 
fathers as children who do not stay on in education.  Later, the estimates that we highlight are 
those that rely on only paternal occupation-union interactions as exclusion restrictions. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
is also likely to be negatively correlated with parental education and income we might expect to underestimate the 
effect of income and education on the dependent variables.  We also examined the effects of living with a stepparent 
but found that, while there was a negative stepparent effects, the interaction between this and education or income 
proved insignificant. Results are available on request.  
9  Note that due to institutional characteristics there are only a few parents with school leaving age of 17, 19, 20 and 
above 23. 
10   Official statistics from the Department for Children, Schools and Families show 67% of boys and 75% of girls 
(averaged over the years examined in this paper) choosing to stay so our own staying-on figures from LFS are a little 
higher. This is likely to be a reflection of the selections that we have made. The official government statistics are 
accessible at http://www.education.gov.uk/rsgateway/DB/SFR/s000734/sfr22-2007rates.xls  
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Lewis (1986) and much subsequent work, demonstrates that wages vary substantially with union 
status, even after controlling for observable skills.  This is also the case in our data. Figure 3 shows 
the kernel densities of the earnings of union member fathers and non-union fathers. The raw 
union/non-union earnings gap for fathers in our selected sample is 8%. If union wage premia reflect 
rents rather than unobserved ability differences it seems plausible to make the (stronger) 
identifying assumption, used in this paper; that union status, controlling for occupation, is 
uncorrelated directly with the parental influence on educational outcomes of the children.  Support 
for the view that unionization picks up differences in labor market productivity is mixed.  Murphy 
and Topel (1990) find that individuals who switch union status experience wage changes that are 
small relative to the corresponding cross-section wage differences, suggesting that union premia 
are primarily due to differences in unobserved ability.  However Freeman (1994) counters this view, 
arguing that union switches in panel data are largely spurious so that measurement error biases 
the union coefficient towards zero in the panel.  In any event, we are assuming, as in Shea (2000), 
that unionized fathers (and their spouses) are not more ‘productive’ as parents than non-union 
fathers with similar observable skills. Using data from the British Cohort Study (BCS) we find little 
evidence to suggest that parenting behavior different across union status of fathers.11  
Parental education is likely to be endogenous. Here we rely on two sources of exogenous variation. 
Reforms to the minimum school leaving age have frequently been used as a source of exogenous 
variation.12 In this paper we identify the effect of parental education on children’s education using 
the exogenous variation in schooling caused by the raising of the minimum school leaving age 
(abbreviated as RoSLA: Raising of the School Leaving Age). Specifically, individuals born before 
September 1957 could leave school at 15 while those born after this date had to stay for an extra 
year of schooling. This policy change creates a discontinuity in the years of education attained by 
the parents. Figures 4A and 4B illustrate this by showing mean years of schooling by birth cohort (in 
4 month intervals) around the reform date.  That is, we take a narrow window of birth cohorts 
around the reform (+/- four years) to minimize the influence of any long-term trends across birth 
cohorts. There is a marked jump in the graph for parents born after September 1957 which 
coincides with the introduction of the new higher school leaving age.  Note that, pre-reform, 
between 30% and 40% of the parents used in this paper had left school at the minimum. So the 
reform did bite and changed the behavior of a substantial fraction of individuals in the affected 
                                                          
11  The British Cohort Study (BCS) data, of all children born in England and Wales in a particular week in 1970, records, in 
considerable detail, the attitudes and behaviours of fathers towards their children. This data suggests rather small 
differences in attitudes and behaviours across union status. For example, 23% on unionised fathers disagreed with 
the statement that  “The needs of children are more important than one’s own”, compared to 18% of the non-
unionised; 60% (62%) of children with unionised (non-unionised) fathers watched TV less than 2 hours per day on a 
typical weekend day; 83% (88%) of unionised (non-unionised) fathers read stories more than once per week; 57% 
(52%) of unionised (non-unionised) fathers always (as opposed to often/sometimes/never) talked to his child even 
when busy; 79% (79%) of unionised (non-unionised) fathers showed the child physical affection at least once per day 
and 36% (37%) praised the child at least once per day; 94% (95%)  of unionised (non-unionised) fathers has helped 
young children learn numbers, etc; and 79% (80%) of unionised (non-unionised) fathers aspired for the child to 
continue in full-time education at age 16. The children also reported behaviour that might well reflect parenting 
styles. For example, 56% (54%) of the children of unionised (non-unionised) fathers made their own bed and 49% 
(52%) cleaned their own room.  
12  See, for example, Harmon and Walker (1995) for the UK; Black et al. (2005) for Norway; and Oreopoulos et al. (2006) 
for the USA.  
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cohorts. Individuals affected by the new school leaving age had, on average, completed half a year 
more schooling than those born just before the reform. Chevalier et al. (2004) showed that the 
effect of this reform was almost entirely confined to the probability of leaving at 15 relative to 16 – 
there was little effect on educational attainment higher up the years of education distribution. 
Hence, this reform only identifies a LATE for individuals with low levels of education. Table 2 shows 
that the proportion of fathers who were born before the RoSLA reform is higher than for mothers, 
reflecting their slightly greater age and the table also shows that early leavers typically have slightly 
younger parents.   
A second source of variation in parental schooling that we exploit derives from parental month of 
birth (as in Crawford et al. (2007)). There are several ways in which month of birth can affect the 
parents’ education levels: through entry timing, leaving timing (Easter leaving rule, whereby 
children born between September and January, inclusive, could leave school at Easter), whole 
group teaching, developmental differences and through peer effects. The academic year starts in 
September but the traditional admissions policy that reigned in the 1950’s and 1960’s, when most 
of the parents in our data were young, allowed entry at the start of the term that the child turned 5 
so that there were three points of entry each year: September, January and April/May. Thus the 
August born would start in April/May and have two fewer terms in primary school than their 
classmates. In the 1950’s and 60’s whole class teaching was the dominant teaching method and 
developmental differences associated with month of birth might imply that the youngest and the 
oldest might fare worse than the average. The year group moves as a single unit through the 
academic system so that they sit examinations at same time and would be at different 
development ages when facing the same examination. Finally, peer effects might also arise because 
the youngest might be dominated or intimidated by the oldest 
This developmental effect is particularly important since most of the parents in the data would 
have faced a selective schooling system where children were segregated into academic or 
vocational schools at the age of 11 based on a single test conducted on the same day across the 
whole country - known as the 11+ exam. Based on the results of this test, children were educated 
either in vocational or academic tracks. Children in the vocational track were much more likely to 
leave school at the minimum compulsory age, while those for in the academic track could go on to 
higher secondary school and university see Harmon and Walker (1995). These two different types 
of schools placed quite different expectations on the children and there was very little movement 
between school types after the age of 11. Figure 5 shows, by year of birth, the average age at which 
the parents in our data left full-time education for those who were September born, the eldest in 
their class cohort, compared to those who were July born, the youngest.13  The typical difference in 
years of schooling between the September and July born was around ¼ of a year for these cohorts 
born in the 50’s and 60’s. Notice that the gap closed completely for cohorts born in the early 1960’s 
when the 11+ examination was abandoned in most areas. Thus, the month of birth effect in 
                                                          
13  We use July rather than August for this comparison since there is likely to be some ambiguity with August-born 
children to the extent that schools exercised discretion at the margin. 
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Our basic model of the impact of parental background on the post-compulsory schooling 
participation of their children is: 
(1) PCc = β0 + β1Sm + β 2Sf + β 3Yf + X'hΛ + f(DBm, DBf, DBc) + ωc 
where the c, m and f subscripts refer to the child, mother’s and father’s characteristics within a 
particular household h14.  The dependent variable PCc is a dummy variable defining participation in 
post compulsory education. Equation 1 is estimated as a linear probability model to subsequently 
facilitate the use of instrumental variables15. The effect of parental education levels, as measured in 
years of schooling of both the mother and father (Sm , Sf), is included in the model linearly.  In 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 there is clearly a diminishing effect of parental education, however a linear 
specification more easily facilitates instrumental variable estimation in later estimates. Log parental 
income Yh measured by father’s real log gross weekly earnings from employment. DB refers to date 
of birth (year and month) so that f(.) controls for cohort trends in paternal, maternal and child 
education. With respect to child’s date of birth, we use a set of dummy variables for each year. 
With respect to parental date of birth (both year and month for both parents), we convert the date 
to a continuous number and then enters the model as in cubic for each parent. Xh contains 
characteristics common to all three members of the family - year of survey dummies as well as 
region of residence at time of survey.  
In later extensions to our basic model, we additionally condition on paternal occupation, so that 
the difference in unionization between occupations does not identify the IV model. We categorize 
paternal occupation into blue-collar/manual versus white-collar/non-manual. We can repeat the 
entire analysis using seven different occupation categories – unskilled, semi-skilled, etc but the 
results are essentially the same. In other extensions to our basic model we add paternal union 
status, so that the identification in the IV model only comes from the interaction terms between 
union status and occupation. This then captures any differences in parenting behavior that 
unionized fathers may have.  
Table 3 summarizes our OLS estimates of paternal income and parental education levels on the 
probability of post-compulsory schooling of the child.16  Specification (1) only controls for parental 
                                                          
14  Standard errors are clustered at the household level throughout the analysis. Only about 13% of the sample are 
siblings. The analysis is repeated separately for sons and daughters. Only about 7% of the sample are same-sex 
siblings and hence used to estimate the same equations.  
15  The marginal effects from probit estimation are very close to the linear probability model coefficient estimates and 
are available on request.  
16   We control for smooth cohort trends by including a cubic function of parents months/years of birth. Full results are 
available on request. Similar estimates based on probit models are also available. While multiple observations of 




years of schooling and suggests positive, if modest, paternal and maternal education effects on the 
schooling choice of both sexes.  The impact of a year of maternal education is to increase the 
probability of post-16 participation by about 2.9 percentage points for boys and 2.4 percentage 
points for girls. The impact of paternal education is somewhat lower especially for daughters. 
Specification (2) examines the impact of paternal income but excludes the parental education 
controls.  These estimates suggest modest but significant income elasticities with the effect being 
11.8% boys and for 8.8% for girls.  Finally specification (3) includes both education and income 
controls. The direct effects of maternal education estimated in Specification (1) are reduced very 
slightly in (3), but the paternal education and income effects are reduced by a factor of 
approximately one third to one half compared to (1) and (2) respectively, highlighting the 
correlation between paternal education and income.  
The second set of estimates (4, 5 and 6) in Table 3 adds the paternal occupation status (blue collar 
dummy variable). This is potentially an endogenous variable, but since unionization rate differs by 
occupation, not controlling for occupation the union instrument might partially capture 
occupational choice which would invalidate its use. As expected, since parental occupation can be 
viewed as a proxy for permanent income, the estimates on education are almost identical to those 
obtained when controlling for paternal income. Thus, in specifications (5) and (6) income is best 
interpreted as deviation from permanent income. As such, the income effects are reduced by 
about 30% for boys and about 50% for girls. Note, however, that when controlling for occupation, 
adding paternal income only marginally reduces the effect of paternal education on the 
educational attainment of children. Thus indicating that the correlation between paternal 
education and income mostly captures the permanent component of income, rather than income 
shocks. 
The final set of estimates in Table 3 shows the effects of parental education and paternal earnings 
when controlling for the effects (not interacted) of paternal union membership and paternal blue 
collar dummy (specifications (7), (8) and (9)). The effects of parental education are virtually 
unchanged compared to the estimates presented in columns (4) to (6); supporting the view that 
paternal union membership has no direct effect on the education decision of his children. For girls, 
the effect of paternal income also remains unchanged compared to specifications (5) and (6) while 
for boys it decreases by less than two percentage points.   
To summarize these results: the effect of parental education on the decision to remain in school 
past compulsory age appears to be quite small - around 2-2.5 percentage points for maternal 
education (larger effects of paternal education on boys) and 2.5 to under 1 percentage point for 
paternal education (larger effects of paternal education on boys). The gap between the effect of 
maternal and paternal education increases when measures of, or proxies for, income are 
introduced since the maternal education effect remains largely unaffected while the paternal 
education effect drops by almost a half.  Note also that the current income effects are greatly 
reduced when a measure of permanent income (the father occupation variable) is controlled for. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
one other sibling in the dataset) and any improvement in standard errors from exploiting the clustering in the data 
would be marginal. 
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To control for the potential endogeneity of paternal income and parental schooling we specify a set 
of first stage equations. In Tables 4a-4d and Table 5 we show first stage and second stage results of 
IV estimation using different sets of instruments. The three first stage equations for maternal 
education, paternal education and the log of paternal earnings are: 
(2) Sm = g(DBm, DBf, DBc) + X'hΓ + Z'f,mΔ+ ψm 
(3) Sf = h(DBm, DBf, DBc) + X'hΠ + Z'f, mΗ+ χf 
(4) Yf = k(DBm, DBf, DBc) + X'hΩ+ Z'f,mΘ+ ϕf 
 
The functions f(.), g(.), h(.), k(.) are polynomials of order three in parental dates of birth and include 
a set of dummy variables in child year of birth. ωc, ψm, χf, ϕf are idiosyncratic errors terms. Z 
contains the instrumental variables. In some specifications we define a dummy variable RoSLA, 
which takes the value one for parents born after September 1957. Given that we control for 
smooth trends in parental date of birth, the RoSLA variable acts as a regression discontinuity and 
picks up the effects of the reform alone. In some other specifications we include a linear month of 
birth effect17 by including a month of birth indicator, MoB (which takes the value of one for 
September born through to twelve for August born). Finally, paternal union membership (PUM) 
and in some specifications, its interaction with the blue collar (i.e. manual worker) dummy variable, 
are incorporated into our first stage model as instruments. All instruments appear in all first stage 
equations. 
We estimated a wide variety of first stages and corresponding second stage equations to examine 
the sensitivity of the second stage estimates to the set of exclusion restrictions used to define the 
instrumental variables. Our IV estimates have the property, which is also a feature of the OLS 
estimates, that the addition of income to a model containing just parental education levels makes 
little difference to the parental education estimates. Thus, we refrain from presenting 
specifications that contain just parental income or just parental education levels.  
The estimates of the first stage equations for sons are shown in Table 4a and Table 4b and the 
estimates for daughters are shown in Tables 4c and 4d. Within each of these tables, each panel 
refers to a different set of estimated equations using different combinations of instruments and 
each column within each panel refers to an individual equation; the paternal schooling equation, 
the maternal schooling equation and the paternal log earnings equation. All of the instruments are 
used in each of the first stage equations. There are some cases where an instrument having a 
significant effect in an equation that a priori it would not be expected to have an effect. For 
example, paternal union membership has a significant effect in the maternal schooling equation. 
This is probably a byproduct of correlation caused by assortative mating.  
In general, being affected by the raising of the school leaving age increased respective parental 
education by between 0.21 and 0.28 of a year, the effects being almost identical for both parents. 
The month of birth effect is also statistically significant and negative for both males and females in 
                                                          
17  Greater flexibility could be sought but at the cost, of course, of potential weakness in the instruments. 
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some specifications but not in others.  However in general, an August born child, on average, left 
school one fifth of a year earlier than a September born child. Comparing across the schooling 
equations, the inclusion of MoB makes little difference to the size and significance of the RoSLA 
effects. The two instruments identify the effects of exogenous shocks to parental education 
through different mechanisms - so that in models where both sets of instruments are included the 
estimates are almost identical to the ones obtained when the instruments are included individually. 
So while both instruments identify a population of marginal students, these are not identical 
populations.  
The paternal earnings equation shows a significant positive union membership wage premium of 
slightly over 9% in Table 4a and 4c, which are consistent with existing UK evidence.  In 
specifications in Table 4b and 4d the interactions of union membership and occupation show that 
the union premium is driven by blue-collar workers. Union membership has no effect on white 
collars earnings but increase blue collar earnings by up to 20%.  
Table 5 shows the second stage estimates and estimate the probability of staying on separately for 
sons and daughters. Each column reports the IV estimates for different specifications of the first 
stage when both parental education and paternal income are instrumented.  The effect of maternal 
education is always imprecisely estimated when controlling for paternal education and paternal 
earnings regardless of which set of instruments is used and never statistically significant. The 
estimate itself varies widely from specification to specification.  
Similarly the effect of paternal education on sons is never significant and varies widely depending 
on the specification used. The effect of paternal education on daughters is between about 0.059 
and 0.078 depending on the instruments used, but only significant in a few cases.  The IV point 
estimate of 0.07 is ten times the size of the OLS estimate of 0.007.  
The effect of paternal earnings varies with the instruments used.  There is never a statistically 
significant effect of paternal earnings on girls and the coefficients vary widely depending on the 
specification. Although the estimated effect of paternal earnings on sons does vary between 
specifications, In columns 5, 6 and 8, the effect of paternal income on sons is stable when paternal 
union status and the interaction between blue-collar father and paternal union status are used as 
instruments and produces results that are significant at either the 5% or 1% level.  When paternal 
union membership and interactions of paternal occupation and union membership are used, the 
effect of the log of paternal income is between 0.157 (column 6) and 0.188 (column 5) depending 
on which instruments for parental education are used.  Given that occupation is probably picking 
up permanent income, the paternal income effects could be viewed as the effects of short term 
income variations. However when only the interactions of union and occupation are used as 
instruments and both union and occupations are controlled for in the second stage (columns 7, 8 
and 9), the estimates become very imprecise and unstable.  
Weak instruments can result in biased estimates in the second stage equation so it is important 
that the instruments’ relevance be tested. In Table 4a (sons) and Table 4b (daughters), the raising 
of the school leaving age, month of birth and parental union membership are used as instruments. 
In the left and middle panels there is exact identification. In the final right-hand panel, both month 
of birth and RoSLA are used simultaneously so there is over-identification. Different F-tests are 
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carried out to test the joint significance of the instruments. For example, in the left-hand panel of 
Table 4a, the F-statistic for the joint significance of Paternal RoSLA, Maternal RoSLA and Paternal 
Union Status in the Paternal Schooling Equation is 8.98. The F-statistic for these coefficients in the 
Maternal Schooling Equation is 13.19 and so forth. The F-Statistic for overall significance of all of 
these variables in all three equations in the left-hand panel is 12.83. The F-statistics for the overall 
significance of paternal month of birth, maternal month of birth and paternal union status in the 
set of equations estimated in the middle panel is 12.29. Thus the F-statistics in Tables 4a and 4c 
don’t always compare favourably with Stock and Yogo (2002) suggested cut-off of around 10. The 
modified F-statistic of Angrist and Pischke (2009) which is suggested for instruments in the case of 
multiple endogenous variables and which partials out the effects of the instruments on the other 
endogenous variables, is also reported. There are no suggested critical values as yet but the values 
in Table 4a are worryingly small.  
In Table 4b (sons) and Table 4d (daughters) one can see the estimates of first stage specifications 
which allow for the interaction of paternal union status and paternal blue-collar worker status to 
be used as instruments. In these specifications, the instruments are much stronger than under the 
specifications in Table 4a (sons) and Table 4b (daughters) both when looking at the significance of 
the instruments across all three equations jointly and when looking at each equation individually. 
Additionally, the Angrist and Pischke F-tests are also much larger relative to those in Table 4a and 
Table 4c when the interaction of union status and blue-collar father was not used as an instrument.    
It is difficult to choose the strongest first stage specification given that there are different ways of 
measuring the strength of instruments. However the set of first stage equations estimated in Table 
4b (sons) and Table 4d (daughters) have instruments which, whilst not very strong, are not weak 
either. Whether or not one includes paternal union status in the second stage equation (and hence 
not using paternal union status as an instrument) does not, in general, greatly affect the strength of 
the instruments. Thus the choice of preferred specification in Table 5 between columns 4, 5, 6 and 
columns 7, 8, 9 depends on whether or not one considers paternal union status as belonging in the 
second stage equation even when controlling for paternal occupation.  
 
5.  Conclusion 
This paper has addressed the intergenerational transmission of education and investigated the 
extent to which early school leaving (at age 16) may be due to variations in permanent income and 
parental education levels.  Least squares revealed conventional results - stronger effects of 
maternal than paternal education and stronger effects on sons than daughters. We also found that 
the education effects remained significant even when household income was included. Current 
income remains significant even when some measures of permanent income are included which 
indicates that some children could be financially constrained in their decision to attend post-
compulsory education. 
When using paternal union status and the interaction of paternal union status and paternal 
occupation as IVs, the IV results reinforce the role of paternal education, for daughters. One year of 
paternal education, for fathers affected by our instruments, increases the probability of his 
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daughter staying on by seven percentage points. In contrast, maternal education has no statistical 
effect on the probability of remaining in education for either sons or daughters regardless of which 
instruments are used.    
Using certain instruments to account for the endogeneity of paternal income, the elasticity of 
income on schooling decisions roughly doubles for sons. However there is no effect on daughters 
and the effect on sons is conditional on excluding paternal union status from the second stage and 
using the interaction of paternal union status and paternal occupation as instruments. However, 
taking the estimates at face value, the size of the effect of short term income, presuming 
occupation status is picking up the effect of permanent income, is relatively small.  
The results imply that policy options that are explicitly aimed at relieving credit constraints at the 
minimum school leaving age such as EMA (see Dearden et al. (2009) may not be very effective in 
promoting higher levels of education (a finding that is consistent with recent UK evidence that used 
linked administrative data for a cohort from age 11 to age 19 (see (Chowdry et al. (2010)). A policy 
of increasing permanent income, like increasing parental education (or say through Child Benefit) 
would on the other hand have some positive effects, especially for daughters. The recently 
proposed increase of the school leaving age to 18 would also benefit future generations through 
































































Figure 4A Distribution of Paternal School Leaving Age by Third of Year of Birth 
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Birth Cohort in Four Month Intervals 
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Figure 4B  Distribution of Maternal School Leaving Age by Third of Year of Birth 
 



























































































































Age distribution:      
% aged 16 23.08 10.34 24.26 23.5 24.01 
% aged 17 39.84 29.87 41.12 40.06 39.92 
% aged 18 37.09 59.78 34.62 36.44 36.07 
      
% staying on at 
16 75.08 50.02 72.37 77.46 78.12 
Observations: 56,650 2,581 12,995 41,074 16,798 
 
Note: The following are dropped from the penultimate column to form the final sample in the following sequence: 
families residing in heavily oversampled Northern Ireland (1,893 observations), families residing in Scotland (3,449), 
families where the parents were not born in England and Wales but who arrived after finishing their schooling 
(6,372), very old or very young parents (317), those missing basic demographic information such as date of birth 
(280), where father is not working (4,004) or self employed (4,353) or unknown (328), union status of father unknown 
(1,316) or has no or missing reported earnings (1,964).  
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Table 2    Descriptive Statistics LFS 1992-2012 Estimation Sample 
   Paternal Log Earnings 
Paternal School Leaving 
Age 
M





Father affected by RoSLA 
M
other Affected by 
RoSLA 
Father born 
 Sept – Dec. 
M
other born  






Age of Respondent 
Girls: N= 8137            
Did not stay in full time education 
(17%): 5.91 15.85 15.94 45.27 43.12 0.46 0.33 0.31 0.33 0.41 17.14 
 (0.53) (1.06) (1.01) (5.48) (4.70) (0.50) (0.47) (0.46) (0.47) (0.49) (0.75) 
Did stay in full time education 
(83%): 6.20 16.85 16.87 47.18 45.11 0.40 0.29 0.31 0.32 0.42 17.11 
 (0.61) (1.54) (1.43) (5.28) (4.67) (0.49) (0.45) (0.46) (0.47) (0.49) (0.77) 
Boys: N= 8661            
Did not stay in full time education 
(26%) 5.91 15.83 15.86 45.39 43.20 0.43 0.32 0.30 0.34 0.42 17.13 
 (0.49) 1.09) (0.98) (5.80) (4.92) (0.49) (0.47) (0.46) (0.47) (0.49) (0.76) 
Did stay in full time education 
(74%) 6.18 16.72 16.79 47.21 45.09 0.41 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.41 17.12 
 (0.61) (1.49) (1.42) (5.35) (4.72) (0.49) (0.46) (0.46) (0.47) (0.49) (0.76) 




 Table 3   OLS estimates of Parental Education and Income on the Probability of Post-Compulsory Schooling of Children 
Specification: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Sons: N=8661          
Maternal School Leaving Age 0.029***  0.028*** 0.026***  0.026*** 0.026***  0.025*** 
 (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) 
Paternal School Leaving Age 0.025***  0.020*** 0.017***  0.015*** 0.016***  0.015*** 
 (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) 
Paternal Log Earnings  0.118*** 0.066***  0.064*** 0.040***  0.062*** 0.038*** 
  (0.008) (0.008)  (0.008) (0.008)  (0.008) (0.009) 
Daughters: N= 8137          
Maternal School Leaving Age 0.024***  0.023*** 0.021***  0.020*** 0.021***  0.020*** 
 (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) 
Paternal School Leaving Age 0.015***  0.012*** 0.009***  0.007*** 0.009***  0.007*** 
 (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) 
Paternal Log Earnings  0.088*** 0.050***  0.045*** 0.027***  0.044*** 0.027*** 
  (0.007) (0.008)  (0.008) (0.008)  (0.008) (0.008) 
Control for paternal union member no no no no no no yes yes yes 
Control for paternal blue collar occ no no no yes yes yes yes yes yes 
 Note: LFS 1992-2012.  Standard errors in parentheses.  Specifications also include year of survey dummies, regional dummies, dummies of child’s year of birth, cubics in parental dates of  
 birth 
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 Table 4a     Instrumental variable estimates: First Stage Regressions 
Corresponding Column in Table 5  1   2   3  




















Paternal RoSLA 0.228** -0.031 0.016    0.213** -0.024 0.015 
 (0.104) (0.091) (0.024)    (0.104) (0.091) (0.024) 
Paternal MoB    -0.021*** 0.006 -0.003 -0.020** 0.006 -0.002 
     (0.008) (0.007) (0.002) (0.008) (0.007) (0.002) 
Maternal RoSLA 0.026 0.255*** 0.075***    0.031 0.240*** 0.077*** 
 (0.102) (0.089) (0.024)    (0.102) (0.090) (0.024) 
Maternal MoB    0.005 -0.017** 0.001 0.006 -0.016** 0.001 
     (0.008) (0.007) (0.002) (0.008) (0.007) (0.002) 
Paternal Union Membership (PUM) 0.230*** 0.249*** 0.093*** 0.228*** 0.250*** 0.092*** 0.229*** 0.251*** 0.093*** 
 (0.050) (0.044) (0.012) (0.050) (0.044) (0.012) (0.050) (0.044) (0.012) 
          
F-test of all instruments  
in each individual  equation 8.98 13.19 25.08 9.65 12.45 21.61 6.84 8.93 15.51 
Angrist and Pischke F test 0.12 0.02 0.02 1.79 4.85 1.93 1.69 2.09 1.42 
F-test of all instruments in all equations jointly  12.83   12.29   9.11  
 Note: All instruments appear in all first stage equations. All second stage exogenous controls appear in all first stage equations but estimates for these are omitted from these tables in the 










 Table 4b      Instrumental variable estimates: First Stage Regressions  
Corresponding Column in Table 5  4, 7   5, 8   6, 9  

















Paternal RoSLA 0.241** -0.018 0.012    0.228** -0.011 0.010 
 (0.104) (0.091) (0.024)    (0.104) (0.091) (0.024) 
Paternal MoB    -0.020** 0.006 -0.003 -0.019** 0.007 -0.003 
     (0.008) (0.007) (0.002) (0.008) (0.007) (0.002) 
Maternal RoSLA 0.017 0.247*** 0.078***    0.022 0.231*** 0.017 
 (0.102) (0.089) (0.024)    (0.102) (0.089) (0.102) 
Maternal MoB    0.005 -0.018** 0.001 0.005 -0.016** 0.001 
     (0.008) (0.007) (0.002) (0.008) (0.007) (0.002) 
Paternal Union Membership (PUM) 0.480*** 0.481*** 0.009 0.474*** 0.485*** 0.008 0.477*** 0.484*** 0.010 
 (0.067) (0.059) (0.016) (0.067) (0.059) (0.016) (0.067) (0.059) (0.016) 
PUM*Blue Collar -0.544*** -0.516*** 0.189*** -0.535*** -0.523*** 0.190*** -0.540*** -0.520*** 0.190*** 
 (0.1) (0.087) (0.023) (0.100) (0.087) (0.023) (0.100) (0.087) (0.023) 
Using PUM as an IV           
F-test of all instruments in each 
individual  equation 14.09 18.27 34.84 14.31 17.93 32.23 10.51 13.11 23.71 
Angrist and Pischke F test 5.84 4.53 65.12 8.95 11.19 64.27 6.24 7.77 35.45 
F-test of all instruments in all 
equations jointly  21.09   20.67   15.27  
Using PUM in second stage as 
exogenous variables          
F-test of all instruments in each 
individual  equation 11.74 13.85 25.4 12.04 13.4 21.95 8.39 9.42 15.82 
Angrist and Pischke F test 7.23 11.34 33.3 13.7 3.83 4.99 7.28 7.44 13.81 
F-test of all instruments in all 
equations jointly  14.44   19.87   13.70  
 Note: All instruments appear in all first stage equations. All second stage exogenous controls appear in all first stage equations but estimates for these are omitted from these tables in the 





 Table 4c     Instrumental variable estimates: First Stage Regressions  





















Paternal RoSLA 0.270*** 0.076 -0.020    0.255** 0.075 -0.021 
 (0.104) (0.092) (0.024)    (0.105) (0.092) (0.024) 
Paternal MoB    -0.012 -0.006 0.001 -0.010 -0.005 0.000 
     (0.008) (0.007) (0.002) (0.008) (0.007) (0.002) 
Maternal RoSLA -0.072 0.255*** 0.029    -0.052 0.238*** 0.036 
 (0.103) (0.091) (0.024)    (0.104) (0.091) (0.024) 
Maternal MoB    0.016* -0.016** 0.005*** 0.016* -0.014** 0.006*** 
     (0.008) (0.007) (0.002) (0.008) (0.007) (0.002) 
Paternal Union Membership  (PUM) 0.231*** 0.287*** 0.094*** 0.233*** 0.288*** 0.093*** 0.231*** 0.288*** 0.094*** 
 (0.052) (0.045) (0.012) (0.052) (0.045) (0.012) (0.052) (0.045) (0.012) 
          
F-test of all instruments in each individual  
equation 8.85 16.21 21.5 8.87 15.01 23.59 6.54 10.65 14.63 
Angrist and Pischke F test 9.05 5.99 8.98 4.25 18.84 9.72 4.46 7.98 7.7 
F-test of all instruments in all equations 
jointly  12.63   13.06   9.15  
 Note: All instruments appear in all first stage equations. All second stage exogenous controls appear in all first stage equations but estimates for these are omitted from these tables in the 









 Table 4d      Instrumental variable estimates: First Stage Regressions  





















Paternal RoSLA 0.276*** 0.082 -0.023    0.263** 0.082 -0.024 
 (0.104) (0.092) (0.024)    (0.105) (0.092) (0.024) 
Paternal MoB    -0.011 -0.005 0.000 -0.009 -0.004 0.000 
     (0.008) (0.007) (0.002) (0.008) (0.007) (0.002) 
Maternal RoSLA -0.068 0.258*** 0.028    -0.049 0.242*** 0.035 
 (0.103) (0.091) (0.024)    (0.104) (0.091) (0.024) 
Maternal MoB    0.016* -0.016** 0.005*** 0.016* -0.014** 0.006*** 
     (0.008) (0.007) (0.002) (0.008) (0.007) (0.002) 
Paternal Union  
Membership 
 (PUM) 0.463*** 0.508*** -0.001 0.462*** 0.507*** -0.001 0.462*** 0.509*** -0.001 
 (0.069) (0.061) (0.016) (0.069) (0.061) (0.016) (0.069) (0.061) (0.016) 
PUM*Blue Collar -0.510*** -0.496*** 0.209*** -0.504*** -0.491*** 0.209*** -0.508*** -0.495*** 0.209*** 
 (0.102) (0.089) (0.023) (0.102) (0.090) (0.023) (0.102) (0.089) (0.023) 
Using PUM as an IV          
F-test of all instruments in each individual  
equation 13.08 19.66 35.71 12.87 18.59 37.23 9.7 13.85 25.23 
Angrist and Pischke F test 4.83 7.4 61.09 7.81 11.29 74.29 5.75 8.25 37.48 
F-test of all instruments in all equations jointly  21.73   21.95   15.78  
Using PUM in second stage as exogenous           
F-test of all instruments in each individual  
equation 11.02 13.09 26.48 10.73 11.67 28.5 7.78 8.74 17.59 
Angrist and Pischke F test 4.66 11.98 10.7 13.04 0.57 1.25 6.23 4.34 7.17 
F-test of all instruments in all equations jointly  18.76   19.05   12.80  
 All instruments appear in all first stage equations. All second stage exogenous controls appear in all first stage equations but estimates for these are omitted from these tables in the 




 Table 5       Instrumental Variable Estimates: LFS 1992-2012 
Specification: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Instruments RoSLA  RoSLA RoSLA  RoSLA RoSLA  RoSLA 
  MoB MoB  MoB MoB  MoB MoB 
 PUM PUM PUM PUM PUM PUM    
    PUM*Blue PUM*Blue PUM*Blue PUM*Blue PUM*Blue PUM*Blue 
Second stage controls       PUM PUM PUM 
 Blue Blue Blue Blue Blue Blue Blue Blue Blue 
Sons: N=8661          


















Maternal School Leaving Age 2.369 -0.063 -0.013 0.003 0.023 0.011 -0.014 -0.077 -0.030 
 (23.721) (0.145) (0.086) (0.061) (0.044) (0.037) (0.063) (0.123) (0.045) 
Paternal School Leaving Age 0.899 -0.108 0.004 0.039 0.025 0.028 -0.010 0.001 0.003 
 (8.668) (0.209) (0.084) (0.061) (0.043) (0.036) (0.070) (0.057) (0.040) 
Paternal Log Earnings -8.237 0.766 0.281 0.162** 0.188*** 0.157** -0.029 -0.169 -0.025 
 (84.138) (0.866) (0.394) (0.069) (0.069) (0.066) (0.140) (0.407) (0.126) 
Daughters: N=8137          


















Maternal School Leaving Age 0.037 -0.011 0.000 0.016 -0.008 0.001 0.024 -0.041 0.021 
 (0.080) (0.044) (0.039) (0.049) (0.041) (0.034) (0.057) (0.264) (0.055) 
Paternal School Leaving Age 0.059 0.069 0.068 0.054 0.078* 0.070** 0.073 0.075 0.078* 
 (0.057) (0.082) (0.046) (0.053) (0.043) (0.035) (0.080) (0.048) (0.041) 
Paternal Log Earnings -0.123 -0.004 -0.022 -0.043 -0.034 -0.031 0.030 -0.119 0.039 
 (0.249) (0.236) (0.153) (0.066) (0.062) (0.060) (0.232) (0.682) (0.165) 
 Notes:  Standard errors in italics.  Specifications include year of survey dummies, regional dummies, dummies of child’s year of birth, cubics in parental dates of birth.  RoSLA is a dummy 
 for the Raising of School Leaving Age, MoB stands for Month of Birth (linear), PUM for Paternal Union Status, and Blue indicates if the father workers in a manual job. 
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